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Abstract
We discuss final-offer arbitration where two quantitative issues are in dispute
and model it as a zero-sum game. Under reasonable assumptions we both derive
a pure strategy pair and show that it is both a local equilibrium and furthermore
that it is the unique global equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Should negotiating parties fail to arrive at an agreeable solution, arbitration serves as
a mechanism whereby a binding resolution may be reached. In conventional arbitration
(CA), the disputing parties submit their cases to an agreed upon arbiter who has full
power to craft whatever fair and just settlement he sees fit. It is widely accepted, however,
that CA has a number of undesirable properties, in particular what has been called the
“chilling effect”: since both parties know the arbiter will craft a compromise, they tend
to take extreme positions. Since it is commonly held that a settlement reached through
negotiation is preferable to a settlement reached through arbitration, one can view the
purpose of a compulsory arbitration as motivating the parties to reach an agreement
during negotiations. This is the paradox of arbitration: the best arbitration mechanism
is that which is used least often.
It was Stevens (1966) who suggested a simple arbitration mechanism now known as
Final-Offer Arbitration (FOA). In FOA, the arbiter must select one of the final offers
submitted by the parties and has no prerogative to craft a compromise settlement. The
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theory was that such uncertainty in the final outcome would combat this chilling effect
driving the two parties to make final offers that are “close” to one another, or better still
motivate them to reach agreement during negotiations.
Since 1975 when FOA was adopted by Major League Baseball for salary disputes,
variants of FOA have been used in various states in public sectors where labor does not
have the right to strike (e.g. police, firefighters). A growing body of literature has been
developed by legal scholars, economists and game theorists studying both the theoretical
and empirical properties of FOA.
The first theoretical model of FOA was introduced by Crawford (1979). With the
assumption that both parties know with certainty the arbiter’s opinion of a “fair” settle-
ment, he showed that FOA would inevitably lead to the same outcome as conventional ar-
bitration. Farber (1980), Chatterjee (1981), and Brams and Merrill (1983) independently
developed game theoretic models of single-issue FOA for which players are uncertain of
the arbiter’s behavior. Farber studied the effect of risk aversion by one of the parties,
and derived the strategy pair which in many cases is a Nash equilibrium. Chatterjee and
Brams and Merrill model the game as zero-sum and consequently assumed both parties
are risk-neutral. Brams and Merrill provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a
pure equilibrium. In all three models, the arbiter is assumed by the players to choose a
“fair” settlement from a probability distribution commonly known to both players and
select whichever player’s offer is closest in absolute value. Kilgour (1994) studied the
game theoretic properties of FOA and extended the Brams-Merrill model to allow for
risk-aversion on the part of the players. Dickinson (2006) further showed that optimism
on the part of the players, in the form of a biased prior distribution, drives the final-offers
apart.
If multiple issues are in dispute, FOA has been primarily implemented in two ways
(Stern et al., 1975). Under Issue-by-Issue FOA (IBIFOA), the arbiter may craft a com-
promise of sorts from the two parties’ offers by choosing some components from one and
some from the other. Alternatively, Whole Package FOA (WPFOA) requires that the
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arbiter select one offer in its entirety. A multi-issue model of FOA was first discussed by
Crawford (1979) and further developed by Wittman (1986). Here the main concern was
the existence of a Nash equilibrium under various assumptions. Wittman was also able
to show in his model that increased risk-aversion leads a player to make a less extreme
final-offer. Olson (1992) discussed how the single-issue model does not accurately reflect
arbiter behavior when more than one issue is in dispute.
In his initial paper introducing FOA, Stevens cautions against the use of the “Whole
Package” variant, stating that “such a system would run the danger of generating unwork-
able awards...the arbitration authority might be forced to choose between two extreme
positions, each of which was unworkable”(Stevens, 1966). Tulis (2013) elaborates: “One
common criticism of package final-offer arbitration is that parties may be tempted to
include outrageous offers.” He further claims that “issue-by-issue final offers...are more
aligned with the objectives of final-offer arbitration.” We argue the opposite - that both
players’ optimal strategy in a multiple-issue FOA is to make all final-offers reasonable.
Furthermore, the additional variance in the awards from WP, as opposed to IBI, acts as
a greater motivator for the parties to reach agreement during negotiations. We show this
by extending the model of Brams and Merrill to multiple-issues and proceed to explicitly
construct a pure strategy pair, proving it is the unique optimal strategy pair.
2 Dual-Issue Final-Offer Arbitration
Our model extends the model defined by Brams and Merrill (1983). Let Player I be the
minimizer and Player II the maximizer in this zero-sum game. Let us consider the case
where each player makes not a single valued offer, but an ordered pair (xi, yi), i = 1, 2.
For this model, we assume that the two issues in dispute are quantitative and valued
identically by the players. An example of such a situation is one in which wage and
workers compensation amounts are in dispute; workers’ compensation may be valued at
the expected compensation amount (in the probabilistic sense). Even issues which are not
3
monetary, such as number of sick days, may have a straightforward monetary valuation
by the parties. We will assume that these issues are positively correlated across the
industry. Let us further assume that both players are restricted to a strategy space S
which is an arbitrarily large, compact subset of R2. Both players are uncertain of the
arbiter’s opinion of a fair settlement (ξ, η), but assume that the arbiter (or a fact-finder)
is sampling from relevant industry data to form an opinion. Thus, by the Central Limit
Theorem, we suppose that their common prior distribution for (ξ, η) is a bivariate normal
distribution, N(µ,Σ) and it is common knowledge (Aumann). Let us assume without
loss of generality that µ = 0. Also let
Σ =
 σ2x ρσxσy
ρσxσy σ
2
y
 ,
where ρ > 0.
In the multi-issue case, FOA is typically handled in one of two ways: Issue-by-Issue
(IBI) or Whole-Package (WP). Under IBIFOA the arbiter rules independently on each
issue presented. A compromise of sorts may be crafted in this way. If the arbiter uses
the IBI mechanic, the players are engaged in two independently decided single-issue FOA
games. By the Brams-Merrill Theorem (1983), we know that the unique optimal strategy
pair of the players is given by
(x∗1, y
∗
1) =
(
−σx
√
2pi
2
,−σy
√
2pi
2
)
(x∗2, y
∗
2) =
(
σx
√
2pi
2
,
σy
√
2pi
2
)
. (1)
Under WPFOA the arbiter must rule in favor of one final-offer vector in its entirety.
It is in this variant that the choice of a distance criterion needs to be chosen by the
arbiter. The “distance” from a final-offer point (xi, yi) to (ξ, η) may be determined in
a number of ways∗. For this model we assume it is common knowledge that the arbiter
∗Many other distance concepts are reasonable and worthy of consideration. These include absolute
total difference, any Lp metric, Mahalanobis distance, or standardized distance. These are considered
by the author in detail elsewhere.
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uses Euclidean distance, or an L2 norm:
DL2
(
(x, y), (ξ, η)
)
=
√
(ξ − x)2 + (η − y)2. (2)
3 Properties of Dual-Issue FOA under L2 Distance
We now establish some properties of the game. Suppose Player I chooses pure strategy
a = (x1, x2) and Player II chooses pure strategy b = (x2, y2), and the arbiter considers
(ξ, η) a fair settlement. We define Ci(a,b), as the set of points in R2 which are strictly
closer to Player i’s final-offer than to the other player’s, namely
C1(a,b) :=
{
(x, y) : (x1 − x)2 + (y1 − y)2 < (x2 − x)2 + (y2 − y)2
}
, (3)
C2(a,b) :=
{
(x, y) : (x1 − x)2 + (y1 − y)2 > (x2 − x)2 + (y2 − y)2
}
. (4)
It is immediately apparent that C1(a,b) = C2(b, a). The midset is
Mid(a,b) :=
{
(x, y) : (x1 − x)2 + (y1 − y)2 = (x2 − x)2 + (y2 − y)2
}
. (5)
We observe that if a 6= b then Mid(a,b) is a line so P((ξ, η) ∈Mid(a,b)) = 0. We can
now define the expected payoff to Player II from I
K(a,b) =

x1 + y1 a = b
(x1 + y1)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C1(a,b)
)
+ (x2 + y2)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C2(a,b)
)
a 6= b
(6)
The first property is anonymity of final-offers; the arbiter essentially does not care
which player submits which final-offer.
Lemma 3.1. K(a,b) = K(b, a).
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Proof. If a = b the proof is trivial. Assume a 6= b.
K(a,b) = (x1 + y1)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C1(a,b)
)
+ (x2 + y2)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C2(a,b)
)
= (x1 + y1)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C2(b, a)
)
+ (x2 + y2)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C1(b, a)
)
= (x2 + y2)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C1(b, a)
)
+ (x1 + y1)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C2(b, a)
)
= K(b, a)
The next property is due to the symmetry of the bivariate normal distribution about
(0, 0).
Lemma 3.2. Let −a = (−x1,−y1) and −b = (−x2,−y2). Then K(−a,−b) = −K(a,b).
Proof. This proof makes use of two facts: First, (ξ, η) ∈ Ci(a,b)⇔ (−ξ,−η) ∈ Ci(−a,−b),
i = 1, 2. Secondly, (ξ, η) and (−ξ,−η) follow the same probability distribution.
K(−a,−b) = (−x1 − y1)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C1(−a,−b)
)
+ (−x2 +−y2)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C2(−a,−b)
)
= −
(
(x1 + y1)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C1(−a,−b)
)
+ (x2 + y2)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C2(−a,−b)
))
= −
(
(x1 + y1)P
(
(−ξ,−η) ∈ C1(a,b)
)
+ (x2 + y2)P
(
(−ξ,−η) ∈ C2(a,b)
))
= −
(
(x1 + y1)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C1(a,b)
)
+ (x2 + y2)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C2(a,b)
))
= −K(a,b)
Next we show that if the players play opposite pure strategies, the expected payoff of
the game is zero.
Lemma 3.3. Let −b = (−x2,−y2). Then K(−b,b) = 0.
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Proof. This proof also relies on the fact that (ξ, η) and (−ξ,−η) follow the same proba-
bility distribution.
K(−b,b) = (−x2,−y2)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C1(−b,b)
)
+ (x2 + y2)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C2(−b,b)
)
= (x2 + y2)
(
P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C2(−b,b)
)− P((ξ, η) ∈ C1(−b,b)))
= (x2 + y2)
(
P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C2(−b,b)
)− P((−ξ,−η) ∈ C1(b,−b)))
= (x2 + y2)
(
P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C2(−b,b)
)− P((−ξ,−η) ∈ C2(−b,b)))
= (x2 + y2)
(
P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C2(−b,b)
)− P((ξ, η) ∈ C2(−b,b)))
= 0
With the previous lemmas, we can show that the value of the game is zero.
Lemma 3.4. Consider a bivariate FOA game where the arbiter chooses (ξ, η) ∼ N(0,Σ)
as a fair settlement and uses L2 distance to measure closeness. The value of the zero-sum
game is zero.
Proof. Because the strategy space S of each player is compact, by the general minimax
theorem the game has a value v.
First suppose an optimal pure strategy pair a∗,b∗ exists. Suppose v > 0. Then for
any pure strategy a of Player I, K(a,b∗) ≥ v > 0. But by Lemma 3.3 K(−b∗,b∗) = 0,
contradicting that v > 0. Similarly it cannot be the case that v < 0. Therefore v = 0.
Now suppose that optimal mixed strategies F ∗1 , F
∗
2 exist. Suppose v > 0. Then for
any mixed strategy F1,
K(F1, F
∗
2 ) ≥ v > 0. (7)
Player II may approximate the optimal strategy F ∗2 by Fˆ
∗
2 where probability mass is
concentrated only on a finite symmetric subset T ⊂ S such that for  > 0 small enough
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and for any mixed strategy F1,
K(F1, Fˆ
∗
2 ) ≥ v −  > 0.† (8)
Define
g∗1(x, y) = fˆ
∗
2 (−x,−y),∀(x, y) ∈ T
and call the associated mixed strategy G∗1.
K(G∗1, Fˆ
∗
2 ) =
∑
(a,b)∈T×T
g∗1(a)fˆ
∗
2 (b)K(a,b)
=
∑
(a,b)∈T×T
fˆ ∗2 (−a)g∗1(−b)K(a,b)
=
∑
(a,b)∈T×T
fˆ ∗2 (−a)g∗1(−b)K(b, a)
= −
∑
(a,b)∈T×T
g∗1(−b)fˆ ∗2 (−a)K(−b,−a)
With a change of variables c = −b,d = −a,
= −
∑
(c,d)∈T×T
g∗1(c)fˆ
∗
2 (d)K(c,d)
= −K(G∗1, Fˆ ∗2 )
Therefore K(G∗1, Fˆ
∗
2 ) = 0, contradicting (7), so v ≤ 0. In a similar manner we can show
that v ≥ 0.
The next property states that optimal pure strategy pairs, if they exist, must be
†This claim follows from three arguments: First, by a well known theorem of Varadharajan the space
of all probability measures M(S) is a compact metric space in weak topology. Secondly, the set of
probability all measures under weak topology concentrated on finite subsets of a compact metric space
S are themselves dense in the space of all probability measures on S. Lastly, by a well known theorem
of Prohorov, any compact subset T of M(S) is characterized by the property that given δ positive, there
exists a compact subset of C of T such that µ(C) > 1− δ for all µ in the set S.
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symmetric about the origin.
Lemma 3.5. Consider a bivariate Final-Offer Arbitration game where the arbiter chooses
(ξ, η) ∼ N(0,Σ) as a fair settlement, and uses L2 distance‡ for deciding closeness. Then
(x2, y2) is an optimal pure strategy for Player II if and only if (−x2,−y2) is an optimal
pure strategy for Player I.
Proof. Suppose b∗ = (x∗2, y
∗
2) is an optimal pure strategy for Player II. Because the value
of the game is zero,
K(a,b∗) ≥ 0,∀a. (9)
If −b∗ is not an optimal pure strategy for Player I then there exists b◦ such that
K(−b∗,b◦) > 0.
By Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2,
K(−b◦,b∗) = K(b∗,−b◦)
= −K(−b∗,b◦)
< 0
but this contradicts (9), so it must be the case that −b∗ is an optimal pure strategy for
Player I. The converse of the lemma is shown in an analogous way.
Recall from (6), that if Player I chooses a = (x1, y1) and Player II chooses b = (x2, y2),
assuming a 6= b,
K(a,b) = (x1 + y1)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C1(a,b)
)
+ (x2 + y2)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C2(a,b)
)
= (x1 + y1)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C1(a,b)
)
+ (x2 + y2)[1−
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C1(a,b)
)
]
= (x2 + y2) + (x1 + y1 − x2 − y2)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C1(a,b)
)
.
‡This lemma is true for any Lp metric, but for simplicity the proof is provided only for L2.
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Lemma 3.6. Suppose in the bivariate FOA game as described the arbiter chooses (ξ, η) ∼
N(0,Σ) and uses the L2 metric to measure closeness. If a pure optimal strategy pair
a∗ = (x∗1, y
∗
1),b
∗ = (x∗2, y
∗
2) exists, then x
∗
2 ≥ 0, y∗2 ≥ 0 and x∗1 ≤ 0, y∗1 ≤ 0.
Proof. We know that if both players are playing optimally then the expected payoff is
zero. Suppose only one of Player II’s offers is negative§; WLOG let x∗2 < 0. By playing
(−x∗2,−y∗2), Player I is guaranteeing a zero expected payoff. Suppose Player I instead
switches to (x∗2,−y∗2). If y∗2 = 0 then the final offers are identical and the net award is x∗2.
Therefore let us assume y∗2 > 0.
K
(
(x∗2,−y∗2), (x∗2, y∗2)
)
= (x∗2 + y
∗
2) + (x
∗
2 − y∗2 − x∗2 − y∗2)P
(
(ξ, η) ∈ C1((x∗2,−y∗2), (x∗2, y∗2))
)
= x∗2 + y
∗
2
(
1− 2P((ξ, η) ∈ C1((x∗2,−y∗2), (x∗2, y∗2))))
Since C1 = {(x, y) : y < 0}, P ((ξ, η) ∈ C1) = P (η < 0) = 12 . Therefore,
K
(
(x∗2,−y∗2), (x∗2, y∗2)
)
= x∗2 < 0.
This contradicts that (x∗2, y
∗
2) is an optimal pure strategy for Player II. Thus x
∗
2 ≥ 0.
Because the choice of component is arbitrary, y∗2 ≥ 0 as well. The argument is the
same to show that Player I’s component offers must be non-positive in order to play
optimally.
4 Local Optimality of Pure Strategies
Having established some of the properties of the game in question, we now derive a pure
strategy pair for the players and show that it is a local equilibrium.
Theorem 4.1. If the arbiter chooses (ξ, η) ∼ N(0,Σ) and uses the L2 metric to measure
§Player II cannot possibly be playing optimally if both x∗2 < 0 and y
∗
2 < 0, for in this case Player I
may simply agree to the Player II’s final offer and happily accept a negative net settlement.
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closeness, the solution points for the two players i = 1, 2
(x∗i , y
∗
i ) =
(−1)i
√
2pi(σ2x + 2ρσxσy + σ
2
y)
4
, (−1)i
√
2pi(σ2x + 2ρσxσy + σ
2
y)
4
 (10)
constitute a local equilibrium provided ρ > max
{
−σ2x+3σ2y
4σxσy
,−3σ2x+σ2y
4σxσy
}
.
Proof. Recall that
K(a,b) = (x2 + y2) + (x1 + y1 − x2 − y2)P (Player I wins) (11)
The event that “Player I wins” occurs precisely when the arbiter picks a random fair
settlement (ξ, η) and
(x1 − ξ)2 + (y1 − η)2 < (x2 − ξ)2 + (y2 − η)2 (12)
which is equivalent to
(x2 − x1)ξ + (y2 − y1)η < x
2
2 + y
2
2 − x21 − y21
2
= w. (13)
Letting Ω = (x2 − x1)ξ + (y2 − y1)η, we have that Ω ∼ N(0, σ2Ω) where
σ2Ω = (x2 − x1)2σ2x + 2(x2 − x1)(y2 − y1)ρσxσy + (y2 − y1)2σ2y . (14)
And Ω/σΩ follows a standard normal distribution. Thus we may express the expected
payoff as
K(a,b) = (x2 + y2) + (x1 + y1 − x2 − y2)Φ(z) (15)
where Φ(z) is the distribution function of a standard normal random variable and
z =
w
σΩ
=
x22 + y
2
2 − x21 − y21
2
√
(x2 − x1)2σ2x + 2(x2 − x1)(y2 − y1)ρσxσy + (y2 − y1)2σ2y
. (16)
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The four partial first derivatives of K(a,b) are then
∂K
∂x1
= Φ(z) + (x1 + y1 − x2 − y2)φ(z)
(
− x1
σΩ
+
(x2 − x1)σ2x + (y2 − y1)ρσxσy
σ2Ω
z
)
(17)
∂K
∂y1
= Φ(z) + (x1 + y1 − x2 − y2)φ(z)
(
− y1
σΩ
+
(x2 − x1)ρσxσy + (y2 − y1)σ2y
σ2Ω
z
)
(18)
∂K
∂x2
= 1− Φ(z) + (x1 + y1 − x2 − y2)φ(z)
(
x2
σΩ
− (x2 − x1)σ
2
x + (y2 − y1)ρσxσy
σ2Ω
z
)
(19)
∂K
∂y2
= 1− Φ(z) + (x1 + y1 − x2 − y2)φ(z)
(
y2
σΩ
− (x2 − x1)ρσxσy + (y2 − y1)σ
2
y
σ2Ω
z
)
(20)
If the players have optimal pure strategies a∗ and b∗ then we must have all four first
derivatives zero. By setting them equal to zero at (a∗,b∗) and by adding all (17) - (20)
we get
0 = 2− (x
∗
1 + y
∗
1 − x∗2 − y∗2)2
σ∗Ω
φ(z∗) (21)
so x∗1 + y
∗
1 − x∗2 − y∗2 6= 0. By adding (17) and (19) we have
0 = 1 +
x∗2 − x∗1
σ∗Ω
(x∗1 + y
∗
1 − x∗2 − y∗2)φ(z∗) (22)
and by adding (18) and (20) we have
0 = 1 +
y∗2 − y∗1
σ∗Ω
(x∗1 + y
∗
1 − x∗2 − y∗2)φ(z∗). (23)
From (22), (23) and Lemma 3.6 we know that
x∗2 − x∗1 = y∗2 − y∗1 = d∗ > 0. (24)
Note also that
σ∗2Ω = d
∗2(α + β), (25)
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where α = σ2x + ρσxσy and β = ρσxσy + σ
2
y . Furthermore, we now have that
z∗ =
d∗((x∗2 + x
∗
1) + (y
∗
2 + y
∗
1))
2σ∗Ω
=
x∗2 + x
∗
1 + y
∗
2 + y
∗
1
2
√
α + β
. (26)
We may now simplify the four equations derived from (17)-(20) as
0 = Φ(z∗) + 2φ(z∗)
(
x∗1√
α + β
− α
α + β
z∗
)
(27)
0 = Φ(z∗) + 2φ(z∗)
(
y∗1√
α + β
− β
α + β
z∗
)
(28)
0 = 1− Φ(z∗)− 2φ(z∗)
(
x∗2√
α + β
− α
α + β
z∗
)
(29)
0 = 1− Φ(z∗)− 2φ(z∗)
(
y∗2√
α + β
− β
α + β
z∗
)
(30)
By taking (27) + (28)− (29)− (30) and using (26) we get
0 = −2 + 4Φ(z∗) + 2φ(z∗)
(
x∗1 + y
∗
1 + x
∗
2 + y
∗
2√
α + β
− 2α + β
α + β
z∗
)
1
2
= Φ(z∗) + 2φ(z∗)(2z∗ − 2z∗)
= Φ(z∗)
Thus z∗ = 0, and by simplifying the four equations (27)-(30) we get that x∗1 = y
∗
1 =
−x∗2 = −y∗2. We simplify σ∗2Ω = 4x∗21 (α + β) and noting that φ(0) = 1√2pi , equation (27)
becomes
0 =
1
2
+ 2φ(0)
(
x∗1√
α + β
)
, (31)
or equivalently
x∗1 = −
√
2pi(σ2x + 2ρσxσy + σ
2
y)
4
. (32)
To show that b∗ is a local maximum for Player II and a∗ is a local minimum for
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Player I we look at the second partial derivatives evaluated at (a∗,b∗). Letting
v(a,b) = (x1 + y1 − x2 − y2), u(a,b) = (x2 − x1)σ2x + (y2 − y1)ρσxσy
∂K
∂x1
= Φ(z) + φ(z)
(
−vx1
σΩ
+
vuw
σ3Ω
)
∂2K
∂x21
= φ(z)
(
− x1
σΩ
+
uz
σ2Ω
)
+ φ(z) (−z) dz
dx1
(
−vx1
σΩ
+
vuw
σ3Ω
)
+ φ(z)
([
− x1
σΩ
− v
σΩ
− vx1u
σ3Ω
]
+
[
uw
σ3Ω
− vwσ
2
x
σ3Ω
− vux1
σ3Ω
+
3
2
vx1w
σ5Ω
])
∂2K
∂x21
∣∣∣∣
(a∗,b∗)
= φ(0)
(
−2x
∗
1
σ∗Ω
− v
∗
σ∗Ω
− 2u
∗v∗x∗1
σ∗3Ω
)
= φ(0)
(
− 2x
∗
1
−2x∗1
√
α + β
− 4x
∗
1
−2x∗1
√
α + β
− 8(−2x
∗
1α)x
∗3
1
−8x∗31 (α + β)3/2
)
=
φ(0)√
α + β
(
3− 2α
α + β
)
since σ∗Ω = 2(−x∗1)
√
α + β. This will be positive if and only if α + 3β > 0, or
equivalently,
ρ > −σ
2
x + 3σ
2
y
4σxσy
. (33)
Similarly,
∂2K
∂y21
∣∣∣∣
(a∗,b∗)
=
φ(0)√
α + β
(
3− 2β
α + β
)
which is positive if and only if
ρ > −3σ
2
x + σ
2
y
4σxσy
. (34)
Note that it is impossible for both (33) and (34) to be unsatisfied, as this would imply
that α < 0 and β < 0 and thus α + β < 0.
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Letting t(a,b) = (x2 − x1)ρσxσy + (y2 − y1)σ2y , the mixed partial derivative is
∂2K
∂y1∂x1
=
∂
∂y1
∂K
∂x1
=
∂
∂y1
(
Φ(z) + φ(z)
(
−vx1
σΩ
+
vuw
σ3Ω
))
= φ(z)
(
− y1
σΩ
+
tz
σ2Ω
)
+ φ(z) (−z) dz
dy1
(
−vx1
σΩ
+
vuw
σ3Ω
)
+ φ(z)
(−x1
σΩ
− vx1t
σ3Ω
− ρσxσyvw
σ3Ω
− y1uv
σ3Ω
+
3utwv
σ5Ω
+
uw
σ3Ω
)
∂2K
∂y1∂x1
∣∣∣∣
(a∗,b∗)
= φ(0)
(
− x
∗
1
σ∗Ω
− x
∗
1
σ∗Ω
− x
∗
1v
∗t∗
σ∗3Ω
− x
∗
1u
∗v∗
σ∗3Ω
)
=
x∗1
σ∗3Ω
φ(0)
(−2σ∗2Ω − v∗(u∗ + t∗))
=
x∗1
σ∗3Ω
φ(0)
(−2(4x∗21 (α + β))− 4x∗1(−2x∗1(α + β)))
=
x∗1
σ∗3Ω
φ(0) (0)
= 0
Then Kx1x1Ky1y1 −K2x1y1 > 0 as long as
ρ > max
{
−σ
2
x + 3σ
2
y
4σxσy
,−3σ
2
x + σ
2
y
4σxσy
}
.
It can be similarly verified that b∗ is a local maximum for Player II when Player I plays
a∗, with the same condition on ρ.
5 Global Optimality of Pure Strategies
We now proceed to show that the pure strategies found in the preceding section are
indeed globally optimal and thus represent the unique optimal strategy pair. We first
briefly consider the special case where σx = σy.
Theorem 5.1. If σx = σy, then the pure strategy pair a
∗,b∗ is a global equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose Player II plays b∗ = (x∗2, x
∗
2). If Player I fixes w˜ < 2x
∗
2 and selects a pure
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strategy a = (x, y) with x+ y = w˜, then he will wish to choose x to minimize
K(a,b∗) = 2x∗2 + (w˜ − 2x∗2)Φ(z).
Since w˜ − 2x∗2 < 0, this is equivalent to maximizing z. Equation (16) becomes
z =
2x∗22 − x2 − (w˜ − x)2
2σx
√
(x∗2 − x)2 + 2ρ(x∗2 − x)(x∗2 − w˜ + x) + (x∗2 − w˜ + x)2
.
The numerator, −2x2 + 2w˜x + 2x∗22 − w˜2, is maximized when x = w˜2 , while the function
in the denominator under the radical is minimized when x = w˜
2
. Therefore, if Player II
chooses the pure strategy b∗, it is sub-optimal for Player I to play any pure strategy off
the line y = x. Since in the one-dimensional case the strategies (a∗,b∗) are a global pure
equilibrium (see Brams and Merrill III (1983)), the proof is complete.
Before showing that a∗,b∗ is a global pure strategy equilibrium for σx 6= σy, we have
to establish a few lemmas.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose Player II chooses strategy b∗ = (x∗2, x
∗
2). If Player I selects pure
strategy a = (x1, y1) then z(a,b
∗) = 0 iff (x1, y1) lies on the circle of radius
√
2x∗2 centered
at the origin. Furthermore, x21 + y
2
1 < 2x
∗2
2 iff z > 0 and x
2
1 + y
2
1 > 2x
∗2
2 iff z < 0.
Proof. From (16)
z(a,b∗) =
2x∗22 − (x21 + y21)
2σΩ
,
and the proof is straightforward.
Lemma 5.3. If another pure strategy a = (x1, y1) 6= −b∗ = (−x∗2,−x∗2) exists such that
K(a,b∗) ≤ 0, then x1 + y1 < 0 and either
x21 + y
2
1 < 2x
∗2
2 or x1 + y1 ≤ −2x∗2.
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Proof. Suppose x1 + y1 ≥ 0. Because the net offer of Player II, 2x∗2 > 0, and Player II
has a positive probability p of being chosen by the arbiter, the expected payoff
K(a,b∗) = p(2x∗2) + (1− p)(x1 + y1) > 0.
This contradicts our assumption.
Suppose x21 + y
2
1 ≥ 2x∗22 . Then z ≤ 0 by Lemma 5.2 and Φ(z) ≤ 12 . Suppose also that
x1 + y1 > −2x∗2. Then
x1 + y1 − 2x∗2 = −4x∗2 + 
for some 0 <  < 2x∗2. But then
K(a,b∗) = 2x∗2 + (x1 + y1 − 2x∗2)Φ(z)
= 2x∗2 − (4x∗2 − )Φ(z)
≥ 2x∗2 − (4x∗2 − )
1
2
=

2
> 0
and this contradicts our assumption.
The following general lemma, a special case of which was used in Theorem 5.1 will be
needed subsequently.
Lemma 5.4. Let
f(x) =
g(x)
h(x)
where both g(x) and h(x) are continuously differentiable functions. Suppose g(x) has a
unique global maximum at xg and h(x) has a unique global minimum at xh (and neither
function has any other local extrema). Then f is maximized at some point between xg
and xh.
17
Proof. Let x¯ = max{xg, xh} and x = min{xg, xh}. Let u ≥ 0. Certainly g¯(u) = g(x¯+ u)
and g(u) = g(x − u) are both decreasing functions of u. Similarly h¯(u) = h(x¯ + u) and
h(u) = h(x−u) are both increasing functions of u. Thus on the interval (−∞, x], f(x) is
maximized at x and on the interval [x¯,∞), f(x) is maximized at x¯. If we are looking for
the maximum value of f , we need not consider any points in (−∞, x) ∪ (x¯,∞); in other
words f attains its maximum value somewhere on the interval [x, x¯].
We now proceed to show that if Player II chooses pure strategy b∗ = (x∗2, x
∗
2) and
I deviates from a∗ = (−x∗2,−x∗2) to any other pure strategy (x1, y1) then it will simply
result in a positive expected payoff.
Lemma 5.5. Suppose ρ > 0, and σx < σy. If Player II plays pure strategy b
∗ = (x∗2, x
∗
2)
then the only pure strategy on the circle x21 + y
2
1 = 2x
∗2
2 where K(a,b
∗) ≤ 0 is a =
(−x∗2,−x∗2).
Proof. If x21 + y
2
1 = 2x
∗2
2 , z(a,b
∗) = 0, so
K(a,b∗) = 2x∗2 + (x1 + y1 − 2x∗2)Φ(0)
= 2x∗2 + (x1 + y1 − 2x∗2)
1
2
= x∗2 +
x1 + y1
2
.
Geometrically we can see that x1 + y1 is minimized on the circle x
2
1 + y
2
1 = 2x
∗2
2 at
(−x∗2,−x∗2).
Against Player II’s strategy b∗ = (x∗2, x
∗
2), any pure strategy a = (x1, y1) may be
represented in terms of r and θ as (x∗2 + r cos θ, x
∗
2 + r sin θ). This will greatly facilitate
the remaining proofs¶. In this representation, with t(θ) = −(cos θ+sin θ), we can rewrite
K(a,b∗) = 2x∗2 + r(cos θ + sin θ)Φ(z) = 2x
∗
2 − rt(θ)Φ(z) (35)
¶For convenience we will define t(θ) := −(cos θ + sin θ) and σ2θ := σ2x cos2 θ + 2ρσxσy cos θ sin θ +
σ2y sin
2 θ. Note that t(θ) = −√2 sin(θ + pi4 ).
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and
z(r, θ) =
2x∗22 − (x∗2 + r cos θ)2 − (x∗2 + r sin θ)2
2r
√
σ2x cos
2 θ + 2ρσxσy cos θ sin θ + σ2y sin
2 θ
=
2x∗2t(θ)− r
2
√
σ2θ
(36)
Figure 1: A sketch of some features of the problem. With b∗ = (x∗2, x
∗
2) fixed, the circle
in blue are the points where z = 0, the ellipse in magenta shows the angle of the minor
axis of the bivariate distribution (see Lemma 5.8). The two rays in green correspond
to Lemma 5.6, and the region between them is where K(a,b∗) is minimized. From
Lemma 5.3, for any point a in the region in gray, K(a,b∗) > 0. In Lemma 5.8 we fix r∗
and show that for all points along the arc shown, the expected payoff is positive.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose ρ > 0, and σx < σy. For all pure strategies a = (x
∗
2 + r cos θ, x
∗
2 +
r sin θ), if K(a,b∗) is minimized then θ ∈ [arctan σ2x−ρσxσy
σ2y−ρσxσy ,
5pi
4
].
Proof. As in Theorem 5.1, suppose Player I first fixes his net offer x+y = w˜ < 2x∗2. With
w˜ fixed, he now chooses x in order to minimize the the expected payoff
K(a,b∗) = 2x∗2 + (w˜ − 2x∗2)Φ(z).
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Because w˜ − 2x∗2 < 0, he chooses x to maximize
z =
2x∗22 − x2 − (w˜ − x)2
2
√
σ2x(x
∗
2 − x)2 + 2ρσxσy(x∗2 − x)(x∗2 − w˜ + x) + σ2y(x∗2 − w˜ + x)2
.
As in Theorem 5.1, the numerator is maximized when x = w˜
2
, which corresponds to
θ = 5pi
4
. The denominator has a unique minimum when
x =
x∗2(α
′ − β′) + β′w˜
α′ + β′
=
x∗2(α
′ − β′) + β′(x+ y)
α′ + β′
,
where α′ = σ2x − ρσxσy and β′ = σ2y − ρσxσy. Solving for y, we get
y = x∗2
β′ − α′
β′
+
α′
β′
x.
So for all w˜, the set of offers which minimize the denominator is a line with a slope α
′
β′ which
passes through b∗. Observe that α
′
β′ < 1, so arctan
α′
β′ <
5pi
4
. Since w˜ < 2x∗2 is arbitrary,
by Lemma 5.4 we know that K(a,b∗) is minimized for some (x∗2 + r cos θ, x
∗
2 + r sin θ)
where θ ∈ [arctan α′
β′ ,
5pi
4
].
Figure 2: An illustration of the angle θM of the minor axis of the bivariate normal
distribution for σx < σy.
We will pause briefly to consider the bivariate normal distribution with ρ > 0 and
σx < σy. In particular, if we look at a contour of constant density, we will have an ellipse.
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The minor axis of this ellipse will be relevant in Lemma 5.8. An analysis of the geometry
is enough to convince one that the angle θM >
3pi
4
. Furthermore, this is the direction
along which the distribution has the minimum variance.
Lemma 5.7. Let ρ > 0, σx < σy, (ξ, η) ∼ N(0,Σ), Ω = ξ cos θ+η sin θ and σ2θ = V ar(Ω).
Then σ2θ is minimized at
θM = arctan
σ2y − σ2x
2ρσxσy
−
√(
σ2y − σ2x
2ρσxσy
)2
+ 1
 > 3pi
4
.
It is helpful to realize that θM is the angle of the minor axis of the ellipse formed by
any constant-density contour of f(ξ, η). The major axis will have the angle θM , referenced
in the proof.
Proof. For any angle θ, V ar(Ω) is given by
σ2θ = σ
2
x cos
2 θ + 2ρσxσy cos θ sin θ + σ
2
y sin
2 θ
=
σ2x + σ
2
y
2
+ ρσxσy sin 2θ +
σ2x − σ2y
2
cos 2θ.
This is minimized or maximized when the derivative
2ρσxσy cos 2θ + (σ
2
y − σ2x) sin 2θ = 0,
or equivalently when
tan 2θ =
−2ρσxσy
σ2y − σ2x
.
By trigonometric identity this is equivalent to
2 tan θ
1− tan2 θ =
−2ρσxσy
σ2y − σ2x
,
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which leads to the quadratic in tan θ
tan2 θ − σ
2
y − σ2x
ρσxσy
tan θ − 1 = 0.
This admits solutions
tan θ =
σ2y − σ2x
2ρσxσy
±
√(
σ2y − σ2x
2ρσxσy
)2
+ 1.
Of the two solutions, one is positive while the other is negative. Let
tan θM =
σ2y − σ2x
2ρσxσy
−
√(
σ2y − σ2x
2ρσxσy
)2
+ 1, and tan θM =
σ2y − σ2x
2ρσxσy
+
√(
σ2y − σ2x
2ρσxσy
)2
+ 1.
One can of course verify that
tan θM = − 1
tan θM
.
Since tan θM > 1, −1 < tan θM < 0. Hence sin θM > cos θM > 0 and sin θM < 0 < cos θM .
Therefore σ2θM < σ
2
θM , so θM minimizes σ
2
θ while θ
M maximizes σ2θ . Finally we note that
because tan θM > −1,
θM > arctan(−1) = 3pi
4
.
Lemma 5.8. Suppose ρ > 0, and σx < σy. For any pure strategy a = (x
∗
2 + r cos θ, x
∗
2 +
r sin θ) 6= −b∗ = (x∗2, x∗2) with θ ∈ [θM , 5pi4 ] and x21 + y21 > 2x∗22 , K(a,b∗) > 0.
Proof. Observe that K > 0 is equivalent to
2x∗2 − rt(θ)Φ(z) > 0 ⇔ Φ(z) < f(r, θ) =
2x∗2
rt(θ)
.
Let us fix r∗ > 2
√
2x∗2. The proof proceeds via three claims:
Claim 1: f(r∗, θ) is a decreasing function for θ ∈ [θM , 5pi4 ].
Proof of Claim 1: This claim follows immediately after noting that t(θ) is an increasing
22
function on (3pi
4
, 5pi
4
), and, from Lemma 5.7, 3pi
4
< θM .
Claim 2: Φ(z(r∗, θ)) is an increasing function for θ ∈ [θM , 5pi4 ].
Proof of Claim 2: Recall that z =
2x∗2t(θ)−r
2
√
σ2θ
. For θ ∈ [3pi
4
, 5pi
4
], r0 = 2x
∗
2t(θ) is increas-
ing and attains its maximum value of 2
√
2x∗2 when θ =
5pi
4
. Since r∗ > 2
√
2x∗2 ≥ r0,
z(r∗, θ) < 0. Because σ2θ attains its minimum at θM and is maximized at θ
M > 5pi
4
, σ2θ is
increasing on [θM ,
5pi
4
].
Consider
|z| = r
∗ − 2x∗2t(θ)
2
√
σ2θ
.
For θ ∈ [θM , 5pi4 ], t(θ) increases so the numerator is decreasing. Meanwhile the denomi-
nator is increasing. Thus Φ(z(r∗, θ)) is an increasing function in [θM , 5pi4 ].
Claim 3: Φ(z(r∗, 5pi
4
)) < f(r∗, 5pi
4
).
Proof of Claim 3: If we fix θ = 5pi
4
, then the players are in the one-dimensional FOA
game, and we already know that a∗ = −b∗ (i.e. r∗ = 2√2x∗2) is the globally optimal
strategy for Player I to play against b∗. Since we have fixed r∗ > 2
√
2x∗2, Player I is not
playing optimally, so K > 0 which is equivalent to the claim.
From these three claims it follows that K > 0 for r > 2
√
2x∗2 and θ ∈ [θM , 5pi4 ].
Lemma 5.9. Suppose ρ > 0, and σx < σy. Then
θM < arctan
α′
β′
,
where α′ = σ2x − ρσxσy and β′ = σ2y − ρσxσy.
Proof. We just need to show that the slope α
′
β′ is greater than tan θM . In other words, we
must show that
σ2y − σ2x
2ρσxσy
−
√(
σ2y − σ2x
2ρσxσy
)2
+ 1 <
σ2x − ρσxσy
σ2y − ρσxσy
.
Suppose for some σx < σy and 0 < ρ < 1 we have a contradiction, that is
σ2y − σ2x
2ρσxσy
−
√(
σ2y − σ2x
2ρσxσy
)2
+ 1 ≥ σ
2
x − ρσxσy
σ2y − ρσxσy
.
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This inequality is equivalent to the following inequalities:
β′ − α′
2ρσxσy
−
√(
β′ − α′
2ρσxσy
)2
+ 1 ≥ α
′
β′
β′ − α′
2ρσxσy
− α
′
β′
≥
√(
β′ − α′
2ρσxσy
)2
+ 1(
β′ − α′
2ρσxσy
)2
− (β
′ − α′)α′
ρσxσyβ′
+
α′2
β′2
≥
(
β′ − α′
2ρσxσy
)2
+ 1
−(β
′ − α′)α′
ρσxσyβ′
+
α′2
β′2
− 1 ≥ 0
−(β′ − α′)α′β′ + α′2ρσxσy − β′2ρσxσy ≥ 0
(α′ − β′)α′β′ + (α′ − β′)(α′ + β′)ρσxσy ≥ 0
α′β′ + (α′ + β′)ρσxσy ≤ 0
(σ2xσ
2
y − ρσ3xσy − ρσxσ3y + ρ2σ2xσ2y) + (σ2x − 2ρσxσy + σ2y)ρσxσy ≤ 0
σ2xσ
2
y − ρ2σ2xσ2y ≤ 0
(1− ρ2)σ2xσ2y ≤ 0.
This is of course impossible as −1 < ρ < 1. Note that we used the facts that β′ =
σ2y − ρσxσy > 0 and α′ − β′ = σ2x − σ2y < 0.
Corollary 5.10. If ρ > 0, σx < σy, and b
∗ = (x∗2, x
∗
2) then for all a = (x1, y1) with
x21 + y
2
1 > 2x
∗2
2 , K(a,b
∗) > 0.
Proof. By Lemma 5.6, K(a,b∗) is minimized for some θ ∈ [arctan σ2x−ρσxσy
σ2y−ρσxσy ,
5pi
4
]. By
Lemma 5.9, [arctan σ
2
x−ρσxσy
σ2y−ρσxσy ,
5pi
4
] ⊂ [θM , 5pi4 ], and by Lemma 5.8, K(a,b∗) > 0 for any
θ ∈ [θM , 5pi4 ] with x21 + y21 > 2x∗22 .
Now that we have shown that against (x∗2, x
∗
2) all pure strategies for Player I outside
the circle x2 +y2 = 2x∗22 will give a positive expected payoff, we consider strategies within
the circle.
Lemma 5.11. Suppose ρ > 0, σx < σy and b
∗ = (x∗2, x
∗
2). For all pure strategies
a = (x1, x2)such that x
2
1 + y
2
1 < 2x
∗2
2 , K(a,b
∗) > 0.
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The proof relies on the concavity of the CDF of the normal distribution within the
circle in question.
Proof. From Lemma 5.3, we need only show that K(a,b∗) > 0 for all a in the semi-circle
described by 
x+ y < 0,
x2 + y2 < 2x∗22 .
In terms of θ, we are restricting our attention to θ ∈ (pi, 3pi
2
). For the angles θ in question,
t(θ) > 1. Recall from (35) that K(a,b∗) > 0 is equivalent to
Φ(z) < f(r, θ) =
2x∗2
rt(θ)
.
First we fix θ˜ ∈ (pi, 3pi
2
). Let r0 = 2x
∗
2t(θ˜). Note by definition that z(r0, θ˜) = 0. Since
z = r0−r
2
√
σ2θ
, it is straightforward to show that
d
dr
Φ(z)
∣∣∣∣
z=0
= φ(z)
dz
dr
∣∣∣∣
z=0
=
1√
2pi
−1
2
√
σ2
θ˜
=
−1
2
√
2piσ2
θ˜
.
Define y as the line tangent to Φ at (r0,
1
2
), specifically,
y(r, θ˜) = − r − r0
2
√
2piσ2
θ˜
+
1
2
.
Note Φ is a concave function for r < r0. Therefore, Φ(z(r, θ˜)) ≤ y(r, θ˜). To demon-
strate that f > Φ for all r < r0, it suffices to show that f > y for all r. Since f and y
are both continuous functions and limr→0+ f(r, θ˜) =∞ y(0, θ˜), it suffices to show that
f 6= y for any r. If the two curves do intersect, then there is at least one solution to the
equation √
2pi(α + β)
2rt(θ˜)
= − 1
2
√
2piσ2
θ˜
r +
t(θ˜)
√
α + β
4
√
σ2
θ˜
+
1
2
,
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or equivalently
0 =
1
2
√
2piσ2
θ˜
r2 −
t(θ˜)√α + β
4
√
σ2
θ˜
+
1
2
 r + √2pi(α + β)
2t(θ˜)
= r2 −
(
t(θ˜)
√
2pi(α + β)
2
+
√
2piσ2
θ˜
)
r +
2pi
√
(α + β)σ2
θ˜
t(θ˜)
.
We have a quadratic in r. Let
rˆ =
t(θ˜)
√
2pi(α + β)
4
+
√
2piσ2
θ˜
2
and
∆ =
(
t(θ˜)
√
2pi(α + β)
2
+
√
2piσ2
θ˜
)2
−
8pi
√
(α + β)σ2
θ˜
t(θ˜)
If ∆ < 0 then we are done. Let us assume that ∆ ≥ 0. If f(r∗, θ˜) = y(r∗, θ˜), it
must that r∗ < r0; for r ≥ r0, f(r, θ˜) > Φ(z(r∗, θ˜)) > y(r∗, θ˜). This gives us a condition,
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namely rˆ +
√
∆
2
< r0.
rˆ +
√
∆
2
< r0
1√
2pi
(
rˆ +
√
∆
2
)
<
r0√
2pi
t(θ˜)
√
α + β
4
+
√
σ2
θ˜
2
+
√(
t(θ˜)
√
α+β
2
+
√
σ2
θ˜
)2
− 2
√
(α+β)σ2
θ˜
t(θ˜)
2
<
t(θ˜)
√
α + β
2
√
σ2
θ˜
+
√√√√√(t(θ˜)√α + β
2
+
√
σ2
θ˜
)2
−
2
√
(α + β)σ2
θ˜
t(θ˜)
<
t(θ˜)
√
α + β
2√√√√√(t(θ˜)√α + β
2
+
√
σ2
θ˜
)2
−
2
√
(α + β)σ2
θ˜
t(θ˜)
<
t(θ)
√
α + β
2
−
√
σ2
θ˜
(
t(θ˜)
√
α + β
2
+
√
σ2
θ˜
)2
−
2
√
(α + β)σ2
θ˜
t(θ˜)
<
(
t(θ˜)
√
α + β
2
−
√
σ2
θ˜
)2
(
t(θ˜)
√
α + β
2
+
√
σ2
θ˜
)2
−
(
t(θ˜)
√
α + β
2
−
√
σ2
θ˜
)2
<
2
√
(α + β)σ2
θ˜
t(θ˜)
2t(θ˜)
√
(α + β)σ2
θ˜
<
2
√
(α + β)σ2θ
t(θ)
t(θ˜) <
1
t(θ˜)
in other words, t(θ˜) < 1, which is a contradiction.
The following is the main result.
Theorem 5.12. For ρ > 0, if the arbiter uses L2 distance as a decision criterion, then
a∗ = (−x∗2,−x∗2),b∗ = (x∗2, x∗2) is a pure global equilibrium pair.
Proof. This follows from the previous lemmas. WLOG σx ≤ σy. If Player II plays pure
strategy b∗, then for any pure strategy a = (x1, y1), K(a,b∗) ≥ 0, and equality is only
achieved when a = a∗.
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6 Variability of Issue-by-Issue and Whole Package
Outcomes
Having shown that under an L2 distance criterion there is a unique pure optimal strategy
pair, we consider the question of whether the issue-by-issue or whole-package variant is
more in line with the aims of FOA. Since FOA makes arbitration a costly alternative
by its inherent uncertainty, we may compare the uncertainty (i.e. variance) between
equilibrium strategies under the two mechanisms. It may come as no surprise that the
arbitrated outcome in WPFOA has a higher variance.
Theorem 6.1. Under L2 criterion, the expected payoff is zero under either Issue-by-Issue
rules or Whole-Package. If both players choose optimal strategies then the variances of
the awards, respectively, are pi
2
(σ2x + σ
2
y) and
pi
2
(σ2x + 2ρσxσy + σ
2
y).
Proof. Under IBIFOA, since the components are awarded independently, the variance is
V ar(K) = V ar(K(x) +K(y))
= E(K(x)2) + E(K(y)2)
=
1
2
(
2
2piσ2x
4
)
+
1
2
(
2
2piσ2y
4
)
=
pi
2
(σ2x + σ
2
y)
Under WPFOA the variance is
V ar(K) = E(K2)
=
1
2
(2x∗1)
2 +
1
2
(2x∗2)
2
= 4x∗22
=
pi
2
(σ2x + 2ρσxσy + σ
2
y)
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Thus we argue that quantitative issues should be arbitrated by package rather than
independently to provide a stronger motivation to the parties to reach “security in agree-
ment” (Stevens, 1966).
7 Conclusions
We have developed a model of two issue final-offer arbitration as a zero-sum game where
both players are risk-neutral, issues under dispute are quantitative and the values are
additive, the arbiter chooses a fair settlement from a bivariate normal distribution com-
monly known to both players and measures how ‘reasonable’ a final-offer is by its L2
distance from this reasonable settlement. We have shown, among other properties, that
with reasonable assumptions the game has a value of zero. If the two components are not
too negatively correlated, locally optimal pure strategies are derived. If we further assume
that the issues are positively correlated, these represent the unique optimal strategy pair.
Finally it was observed that in this case whole-package FOA leads to an outcome with
greater variance than IBI, and would act as a greater motivator to reach agreement in
negotiations.
This represents only an initial model of the multi-issue FOA game. Many variants
are worthy of consideration. Firstly the arbiter may use one of any number of decision
criteria including L1 distance, L∞ distance, total absolute difference, and Mahalanobis
distance. It may be the case that the final-offer vectors must be standardized before
measuring distance, and Players valuation of a final-offer may be more complicated than
the sum of the two components. Another obvious extension is to look at the n-issue
game.
Finally it worth considering an extension of final-offer arbitration to n-player games.
This would have applications for inheritance splitting, for example, where the heirs cannot
agree on a fair split and need to bring in an arbiter. To our knowledge, final-offer
arbitration has not been used in this scenario but we feel it would be an effective means
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to encourage agreement among the players.
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